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Abstract

This paper discusses primarily the internal power struggle which is now taking place within the Arab world from Morocco to the Persian Gulf. It is not suggested that the future evolution and orientation of the Arab world can be deduced solely from an examination of Arab politics. The continued existence in the Arab "homeland" of "enclaves" controlled by non-Arab powers, such as Algeria, Israel, and certain areas of the Arabian Peninsula; the Western stake in Arab oil; the geographic location of the area through which major international communication routes must pass; and the policies of the USSR ensure that the Arab world, as most Arabs admit, cannot evolve in isolation. However, the domestic forces at work within the Arab world are increasingly assuming greater importance and in these circumstances it seems useful to examine them, both for the light they throw on conflicts within and among the Arab states and as an essential preliminary to any consideration of the capacities of non-Arab powers to influence developments in the area.

The various elements now seeking to obtain or consolidate power within the several Arab states can be divided into three broad categories in terms of their attitudes toward the question of social change. The strength of these elements -- traditionalists, reformists, and radicals -- varies greatly within each state, but the rate and direction of change in one state clearly affects developments in the others. These categories do not of themselves permit specific predictions of behavior. Whether a given ruling group will follow extreme or moderate tactics in its actions or reactions depends, among other things, on its assessment of the strength of its opponents and the international and domestic consequences which are likely to ensue at any given time. However, the categories do serve the purpose of broadly differentiating between the ideologies and goals of Arab political movements and their leaders and suggest the existence of certain limits in their political, social and economic behavior which inhibits even the most opportunistic politicians.

Power struggles among elites within the Arab states are accompanied by intensified efforts to resolve a long existing Arab problem: the achievement of "unity" within and among the three major power centers of the Arab world -- Northwest Africa (known as the Maghrib), the Nile Valley, and the Valley of the Tigris and Euphrates. Rivalry between the latter two has been especially acute, focusing on the problem of control of the buffer zone which separates them -- the Western Fertile Crescent (historic Syria) and the Arabian Peninsula --, a struggle which has brought to the fore once again, especially in Lebanon, the centuries-old problem of ethnic and religious minority elements fearful of domination by the area's Sunni Arab majority. However Arab unity is no longer being sought merely in terms of general agreement to eliminate foreign influence and control. The phase of "national liberation" is passing and today a common approach to internal political problems is also held to be an essential facet of Arab unity.

Thus in the Arab East radical Iraq and reformist Egypt are in conflict, while in the Arab West reformist Tunisia is troubled by the prospect of a Maghrib unity dominated by radical Algerians and Moroccans. The trend throughout the area toward mass participation in politics, already well advanced in the Maghrib and Iraq, suggests that regimes, whether traditionalist or reformist, which seek to resist it may find themselves in growing difficulties. This is particularly true of the UAR. The UAR certainly seems to have the resources to maintain itself and even, possibly, to expand over the next several years, but, assuming a continuation of present trends in Iraq, the problem of creating broad positive support, especially in Syria, is likely to become increasingly acute.

The relationship of the Arabs with the outside world will increasingly be conditioned by non-Arab attitudes toward these regional and inter-regional issues. Arabs and non-Arabs may from time to time reach agreement on tactics designed to meet specific situations but, especially in the Arab East, the basic policies of Arab leaders are unlikely to be entirely satisfactory to either the West or the Bloc. It is possible that the pace of events in Iraq may be progressing faster than the USSR might have wished. On the other hand, the return of the UAR to a public posture more favorable to Western interests is likely to make more discreet, but not significantly inhibit, Egyptian efforts to promote acceptance of Cairo's brand of neutralism not only in the Arab world but in Africa as well. Arab leaders in the Maghrib, where conflicts with the West have tended to be more political and less cultural, have been more desirous of reaching mutually beneficial undertakings with the non-Arab world. But the Algerian situation continues to intervene and, reinforcing domestic pressure for drastic social change, threatens to undermine the moderates' authority and popular appeal.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Arab world, stretching from Morocco on the Atlantic Ocean to Iraq on the frontiers of Iran, has by and large, over the past decade, succeeded in achieving at least the outward forms of political independence. Nearly a dozen new states have emerged from various degrees of British, French, and Italian control. Only the British-controlled rim area of the Arabian Peninsula, French-dominated Algeria, minor Spanish holdings on the Moroccan coasts, and, in the Arab view, Israel persist as "foreign" controlled segments of the "Arab homeland."

The efforts of the Arabs to resolve the problems created by the remaining foci of conflict with the West continue to complicate the relations of the Arabs with the outside world and with each other, but it is becoming increasingly apparent that the change in status of the bulk of the Arab world from colonial dependencies to sovereign states has brought about the emergence of new currents which will redefine the terms in which "Arab" issues are debated. With the drawing to a close of the phase of "national liberation" and its pre-occupation with "imperialism," the phase of "national consolidation" is beginning to dominate the scene. "Imperialism" will remain an important issue so long as the foreign enclaves persist and the area continues to be a battleground in the cold war. However, the new phase increasingly involves the contests of strictly indigenous elites for power to determine and control the destiny, nature, and orientation of the Arab world in its modern "renaissance." The struggle for power begins at the "national" level, i.e., within the framework of the "national" boundaries -- in some cases largely artificial -- which divide the Arab world. It progresses to the regional level: the effort to apply historic political and economic ambitions under the guise of an idealized Arab solidarity is translated into such concepts as Maghrib unity, the unity of the Nile Valley and the unity of the Fertile Crescent. Even before such vaguely defined but, to the Arab, deeply meaningful schemes can be implemented, the contest reaches yet another level: that between the regions and especially between the Nile and Mesopotamia as they struggle for control of the intervening area -- Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Arabian peninsula.

In the past, and indeed for several millennia, such rivalries have been taking place but at present and for the foreseeable future they present a new dimension. Heretofore the Arabs have been primarily engaged in a struggle against foreign political and economic domination. But from the beginning of this struggle the Arabs, especially in the East, have also been engaged in a search for "identity." The problem here is to reconcile objective goals with an idealized inherited historic and cultural legacy and both with the demands and the adopted values of the modern world. The multiplicity of solutions put forward is reflected in the present struggle for power, supported in certain circumstances by foreign powers, but without that degree of imposed foreign guidance and manipulation which so often characterized inter-Arab maneuvering since World War I. The doctrinaire socialist ideas of Moroccan leaders, the

middle-class social reformism of Egypt, and the extreme radicalism of Iraq owe much to European models, but their exponents are Arabs having their own capacity to act as they see fit and especially to disregard or heed foreign advice, depending on their own evaluations of the dictates of the local situation, and eclectically to utilize these ideologies in the pursuit of specifically Arab goals. Some direct foreign control still persists in the Arab world. But French policy in Algeria, British tactics in the Arabian peninsula and Israel's very existence serve also to heighten pressures for political change in the rest of the Arab states, as each Arab faction puts forward its claim to be the most efficacious advocate of Arab "liberation" and "unity."

The fundamental contest for power in most of the states -- and therefore in the principal regions -- which comprise the Arab world increasingly focuses on the pace and nature of socio-economic change. In certain countries -- the Maghrib states, Iraq, Egypt, -- class divisions as understood in the Western world have taken on increasingly important political significance. In other areas -- Jordan, the Sudan, Libya, -- the internal struggle for power is still primarily carried on in terms of conflict between special interest groups of a single class; the political issues are expressed in sectarian, tribal, provincial, and ethnic rather than in "class" terms. But even in these areas, as a result of modernization, students, labor leaders, professional and military men, and merchants are beginning to act in terms of concepts transcending historical loyalties. The logical political consequence of the economic and technological development of the newly independent Arab states will be the acceleration of this trend.

These new concepts have brought about a whole series of changes in the regimes of the Arab states. Over the last decade, traditional ruling aristocracies -- tribal, secular, or religious -- have either been overthrown by force or have acquiesced in varying degrees in the transfer of power to reformist -- primarily middle-class -- regimes of military or civilian character. These reformist regimes in turn face the challenge of other groups seeking radical social and political change ostensibly for the profit of the urban and rural masses whose support is essential to their ultimate success. Except in Morocco and Iraq, where they have obtained positions of influence, the radicals have made little progress. But if the areas of the Nile Delta and Damascus and Beirut, where the middle-class has been more successful, are only facing minor threats of social revolution at the present time, the prospects for other areas are much less promising.

Radical or reformist changes which occur may be comparatively calm and orderly as in Morocco and Egypt or violent as in Iraq and Syria. The tactics of all groups -- traditionalists, reformers, and radicals -- may be moderate or extremist depending on the degree and nature of the opposition they encounter and the extent and nature of the support they

receive. Each of the various contestants for power elicits the support of similarly-minded allies among the other Arab states. Support may also be accepted and even solicited from the non-Arab world. "Foreign collaboration" is probably tacitly accepted in the Arab world as an inevitable consequence of the area's geography and economics and its need for European skills and ideas if it is to play the international role its leaders and peoples demand. But the "collaboration" will only be tolerable if those in whose behalf it occurs clearly retain in the eyes of the public at least the appearance of initiative and freedom of action. The more aid given, the fewer the formal strings which can be tolerated. Consequently the relationships between these factions and the outside world -- the West and the Bloc -- have been characterized by alternating periods of harmony and strong recrimination. Leaders, especially in the Arab East, have found that allegations of Great Power interference are most effective in rallying public support. But at the same time they are aware of the importance of counter-balancing great power ties if they are to avoid the appearance of leading their countries into a precarious isolation without powerful friends. Neither subservience nor isolation is acceptable in the modern Arab world; at the same time the search for unity and the existence of constant power struggles domestically and between the Arab regions, make constant relationships with the Great Powers seem almost impossible to obtain.

Thus the prospects for the Arab world are the continuation and even intensification of multiple and often conflicting Arab efforts to achieve internal and regional stability and homogeneity, and ultimately unity itself. Reformist Cairo and radical Baghdad will compete to dominate the Arab East, while in the Arab West moderates of both reformist and radical factions will seek to survive the extremism generated by uneven social change accentuated by French policy in Algeria. In the process the West is likely to find its opportunities to exercise direct influence considerably diminished, though there will remain considerable room for indirect influence. However, the Bloc, although initially benefitting from the West's discomfiture, is not likely to assume a commanding role in the area as a whole. Although the trend of events in Iraq shows significant Communist progress, neither the radicals of the Maghrib nor the reformers of the Nile favor the communist program and for the foreseeable future they appear strong enough at least to prevent significant communist gains. Moreover it is possible that close relations with "non-imperialist" Europe -- West Germany, Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece -- and with the Afro-Asian and possibly Latin-American countries may offer a middle way leading to a modus vivendi between the Arabs and the non-Arab world.

II. DOMESTIC DYNAMICS OF THE ARAB STATES

A. The Characteristics of the Arab Elites

Broadly speaking, the various factions involved in the conflicts within and among the Arab states can be divided into three categories in

terms of their attitudes towards the question of social change. These are the traditionalists, the reformists, and the radicals. The strength and cohesiveness of these factions vary in the different parts of the Arab world. The traditionalists are strongest in those areas comparatively isolated from the impact of "modernism" i.e. European ideologies, techniques, and material evidences of an industrial civilization. The reformists are strongest in those areas of the Arab world which have been most heavily exposed to these influences through trade, conquest, and cultural penetration. The radicals emerge most powerfully in areas which have been touched by modernization but which lack the stabilizing factor of a substantial middle-class whose social and economic conservatism inhibits drastic actions and favors a gradualism designed to protect the social system and its inherited values from too abrupt a transition. Their potential is increased when there exist religious and ethnic differences susceptible of exploitation.

Traditionalists. The traditional wielders of power in the Arab world have been those religious or secular figures -- the "upper class" -- whose prestige and status derive from traditional symbols in Arab society, especially religion and family descent. Usually these figures are also associated with wealth, but mere possession of wealth is not often a means of entrée into the traditionalist elite (although power expressed through conquest may be). The main object of these traditional rulers and their supporters and of traditionalist groups in general is the preservation of the existing structure of political and economic power with a minimum of social change. This group includes religious and tribal zealots who wish to return to an idealized past free of non-Arab and non-Muslim influences, but the majority of traditionalist leaders are not averse to employing modern methods and techniques to strengthen their positions. As a group, the traditionalists think politically in terms of a personal absolutism sanctioned by custom. Economically they practice a paternalism which compounds prestige-motivated luxury and largesse with a general lack of awareness of the financial requirements of the modern state and the people as a whole. Among the representatives of this group are the rulers of the Arabian peninsula and of Libya, the tribal sheikhs of Iraq, the Druze amirs of Syria, and the feudal chiefs of the Moroccan Atlas. However the King of Morocco has known how to adapt a position which is religiously sanctioned to meet the needs of essentially secular institutions without abandoning that traditional prestige which allows him to be more than a constitutional figurehead.

The Reformists. Predominantly drawn from the middle-class, reformist groups advocate selective modernization of the inherited social order, since from the social, economic and political changes which ensue they derive both livelihood and status. This group includes the bulk of the small merchants and traders, civil servants, military officers, professionals and the technicians and students of the Arab world. This class has long been influenced by traditional values and has not abandoned them

altogether, but on the whole wealth and power are the goals of its members -- not traditionalist symbols which are recognized as backward and outmoded in a modern society.

In its political thinking a reformist elite is committed in theory to constitutional government by its acceptance of modernization and its concern to be representative. But this theoretical commitment is largely nullified by an inherited tradition of authoritarian political practices, and by the pressure of urgent social and economic problems demanding centralized direction of the country's economic growth. However, being essentially committed to the principle of private property, the reformists' method of state control is by preference indirect. The preservation of the "public" interest -- i.e. the interest of the middle-class as the ruling elite -- is assured through state supervision of the private sector with safeguards against excesses by management or labor which could lead to "monopoly" or "radicalism."

As elsewhere, the middle-class in the Arab world acts politically through special interest groups. Should one of these groups -- for instance the military -- be successful in its efforts to break a "monopoly" of power, it tends to become, itself, a new elite and therefore the object of attack by other special-interest groups. Therefore its objective is to consolidate its power and newly-acquired status and to protect itself not only from above but also from below. For it may face challenges not merely from other elements of the middle-class but also, potentially, from the "people" -- the peasants and the workers in whose name it may endeavor to speak but whose loyalties it has great difficulty in winning. Successful reformist elites would seem to require a dynamic leader who can hold together the various social and special interest groups and, if possible, weld them together in a national program.

Reformist elements throughout the Arab world have as their stated initial objective the replacement of traditional patterns of rule by modernized institutions. But reformist elites, even within the same country, differ among themselves as to the extent to which they are prepared to accept the political consequences of the social changes which are occurring with growing rapidity in the Arab world. Certain reformists, as in Tunisia, adopt programs emphasizing national unity in which all classes and special interest groups are given a positive role to play. Irreconcilables are isolated from the body politic while potential dissidents can be neutralized and loyal followers rewarded through the resources of the political party and eventually the governmental bureaucracy itself.

The Egyptians on the other hand define their program as "revolutionary" and "socialist." They actually seek changes in the outward forms rather than the substance of the political, social and economic legacy of the past, although their condemnation of "feudalism" and monarchy expresses

a deep and sincere aversion to any concentration of economic and political power posing obstacles to upward mobility which, if carried to excess, could seriously damage the political and economic prospects of the middle-class. The Egyptian program, like that of Tunisia, envisages mass participation in politics; it also has a recognized channel for advancement -- the military officer corps -- and it, too, uses the facilities of the bureaucracy -- and private industry and commerce as well -- to maintain its authority. But unlike Tunisia, the Egyptian regime has yet to develop truly positive support outside the urban middle-class despite its claim to speak for "the people" as a whole. Egypt's military rulers believe that "responsibility" must be the prerequisite for full participation in government. However they also feel compelled, during the "transitional phase," to retain for the state, as guardian of the public welfare, the sole right to choose both ends and means for all the inhabitants. By precluding significant popular initiative, even in support of the regime, Egypt's "socialism," -- essentially a policy of "social welfare," perpetuates the very lassitude it seeks to overcome. The difficulty is compounded by the inability of Egypt's rulers, like most of their predecessors, to improve the conditions in which the bulk of Egypt's expanding population lives.

The Radicals. Usually -- but not always -- radical leaders come from middle-class and frequently ethnic and religious minority elements frustrated in their aspiration to power and influence. Because they are an outgroup which sees little chance of gaining and maintaining power through existing social and political systems and values, they seek to replace traditional or reformist structures with new patterns heavily influenced by European -- Eastern or Western -- socialist principles of secularism and class struggle. Their abrupt repudiation of past cultural traditions and their efforts to stir up the heretofore largely apolitical rural and urban masses as in Iraq are particularly disturbing to the reformists of the Arab East. The Ba'thists of Syria are attempting to meet these pressures for change through a socialist program, peculiarly Arab in character. But inhibited by its milieu, Ba'thist socialism may prove in the long run to differ only in minor respects from the "social" program of the reformist Egyptian regime. In the Maghrib, however, ideological European-type socialism has firmer roots. Experience with essentially secular government, an indigenous tradition which permits considerable freedom for individual and group variations, long exposure to French concepts, models, and values, a comparatively restricted middle-class and increased political consciousness among the workers and peasants are some of the factors which help to explain the growth of radicalism in this area.

Like the traditionalists and reformists, the radicals follow an authoritarian political approach. (In fact the radicals seem to work relatively well in coalition with traditionalists since the authoritarianism of both is admitted rather than denied as in the case of the reformists.)

But the authoritarianism of the radicals is usually of an impersonalized nature. While outstanding individual leaders are not precluded, especially among the Communists, the tendency of the radicals is to produce collective leadership comprising the elected heads of the various groups, labor, peasants, students, youths etc. -- together with such others as the intricate party organization may bring to the apex of the pyramid.

In their economic thinking, the radicals express a preference for massive state intervention in the interests of the masses. They are willing to sacrifice established patterns of trade and finance for the sake of investment. However, deep-rooted social patterns inhibit state intervention in the field of personal property; few Arabs would advocate collectivization or genuine communal property.

In the present circumstances genuine radicalism in the Arab East appears for the moment to be the preserve of the Communists. The area's regimes -- both traditionalist and reformist -- have tended to equate radicalism with subversion and consequently there has been no way for a legal non-Communist radical movement to arise. In the Maghrib, on the other hand, as elsewhere in Africa, working-class socialists have become ministers, but in so doing they encounter a new problem: the need to reconcile the demands of their followers with technical and policy considerations which, as officials, they cannot neglect. Should they fail to produce convincing evidence that they continue to work in the interests of masses, their authority may be undermined by advocates of particularist causes or by extremist elements, including the Communists, who seem to promise more rapid and sweeping gains.

B. Characteristics of the Arab Regimes

Internal struggles are now proceeding at different rates in the several Arab countries. Since these countries are becoming more and more closely linked by cultural ties, modern communications (press and radio), trade, migrations and visits, the rate and direction of change in one state affects the rate in others. The impact of the Egyptian "revolution" of 1952 and its championing of the middle-class cause of reform hastened the pace in the Sudan, the Fertile Crescent, and even in the comparatively isolated Arabian Peninsula. Similarly, the militant and populist orientation of the Algerian FLN has contributed to the rise of radicalism in Morocco.

Local conditions and inter-action have combined to produce within the Arab world regimes most of which reflect a continuing competition between and within elites for primacy. Traditionalist Yemen and reformist UAR and Tunisia have comparatively homogeneous governments; however, the rest of the Arab states are ruled by coalitions of varying character. Traditionalist rulers in Libya and Saudi Arabia have shared their power to a limited extent with reformist elements. At the opposite end of the

spectrum, radicals in Morocco and Iraq tend to dominate those with whom power is shared -- the traditionalist King and Iraqi civil and military reformists. Jordanian political leaders continue to be strongly influenced by traditional values and tactics. Although the state operates in a modern secular framework mass participation in politics is discouraged or even suppressed. Stability depends on coercion, exercised through well paid security elements -- principally tribesmen who have long been at odds with the sedentary population --, on the allocation of key governmental posts to leaders commanding local status and authority of a quasi-feudal nature, and on the personal prestige of the Hashimite King Husayn. The succession of regimes in the Sudan stems from the inability of reformist rulers to dominate the pressures of still powerful tribal and religious traditionalist elements. Finally, in Lebanon uneasy stability is attained through delicate negotiation and the formation of pragmatic alliances among the leaders of the country's multiple special interest groups.

III. INTER-ARAB RELATIONS -- THE THREE REGIONS

Just as the ending of the phase of national liberation has been followed by the emergence of more clearly defined issues between indigenous groups in competition for control of the several Arab states, so also has there followed greater pressure for resolution of the primary inter-Arab question -- the question of unity among these states. From the very beginning of Syrian Arab resistance to Turkish domination, there has persisted, more or less clearly articulated, the notion that Arab unity was a historic truth that would re-emerge once foreign domination had been removed. This has been an article of faith among the Syrian originators of the Arab unity movement since the early part of the twentieth century. It was not until World War II, however, with the imminent independence of a majority of Arab states and the appearance of concrete steps toward Arab unity in the form of the Arab League, that Egyptian nationalism joined hands with the Arab unity movement and the Maghrib was conceived as constituting a part of a unified Arab world. In the Maghrib, the mystique of union is playing an increasingly important role in relations between the states of that area and in the relations of the Arab West with the Arab East. The fact that the destiny of the individual Arab states is now largely in the hands of indigenous elements has only added a new dimension to this factor. The question, at present, is not "whether union?" but rather, "on what terms union?" In other words the proponents of Arab unity are being obliged to face the fact that historically unity was religious not political in character and that modernization has elements which inhibit as well as stimulate the cause of unity.

The Arab world is customarily viewed in terms of two major areas -- the Arab East, including Egypt and the Sudan, and the Arab West (the Maghrib), with Libya forming a division rather than a link between them.

However, the Arab world more appropriately falls into three distinctive power centers -- Mesopotamia, the Nile Valley and the Maghrib. The first two -- Baghdad and Cairo -- have, almost from the beginning of recorded history, been in varying degrees of competition to dominate or at least influence the buffer zone which separates them -- the Western Fertile Crescent i.e., historic Syria -- and to a lesser extent the Arabian Peninsula. The circumstances of history and geography have combined to ordain for these two areas an intimacy (and rivalry) which has not and probably will not characterize the relations of either with the third region -- the Maghrib. Only in relatively recent times -- with the lessons of World War II, the emergence of independent Arab states in North Africa and the continuation of the "colonial" war in Algeria -- has the Maghrib emerged from comparative isolation to become an area of growing concern to both of the other regions and to seek, itself, to put forth its own ideas of Arab interests. Bound together in a more or less loose community by the power of the cultural idea of the "Arab nation," and increasingly acting in terms of this notion, these regions nevertheless have a diversity of interests and motivations stemming from their differing historical and social evolution that is sufficient greatly to complicate the search for Arab unity in a form transcending the particular interests of any one of them.

Mesopotamia. From the time of the Assyrian Empire the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers has contained a center of political and cultural strength which at various times has extended its influence whenever possible or necessary towards the Mediterranean. In large measure, the drive westward over the Syrian Desert to the coast has been in response to real or potential threats -- more often political and economic than military -- from the southerly center of power which has existed in the Nile Valley since the time of the pharaohs. Syria has also had an attraction for the rulers of Mesopotamia either as an extension of empire or as a defensive outpost against Egyptian ambitions. In modern times, with the spread of communications links and the discovery of oil, Mesopotamia's rulers have also looked southward to the Persian Gulf and its littoral.

Nile Valley. For Egypt, Syria has historically offered the same promises of empire and security. Until modern times the only effective route of land invasion of Egypt, the Eastern Mediterranean coast and its hinterland have been special objects of concern for the rulers of Egypt. This concern has especially prevailed whenever a dynamic regime controlled Mesopotamia. But it has also existed when Mesopotamian power was in eclipse and the threat came through that area from the North and West -- from Hittites, Crusaders, Turks, and Israelis.

While the Mediterranean coast and Syria is for Egypt of important strategic concern, the southern areas of the Nile Valley offer problems of even more vital economic and political interest and have also historically inspired a dynamic and expansionist policy, especially in the Sudan.

Similarly, the historic strategic concern of Egypt to control the Red Sea and the bordering Hijaz area has assumed in modern times important economic and political overtones as a necessary preliminary to extension of Egyptian influence throughout Arabia to the Persian Gulf. Present Egyptian activity in Ethiopia, the Somalilands and East Africa is partially explicable in these terms.

Egypt's interest in its Western hinterland goes back to medieval and even pharaonic times. In the modern context, the position of Libya, between the Maghrib and the Nile Valley, makes it, much like Syria to the North, an area of strategic concern since, in the hands of Egypt's enemies or rivals, e.g. the UK, it could be used to hamper Egypt's efforts to expand its influence or even directly threaten Egypt itself. Its newly discovered oil riches will heighten Egypt's interest in influencing developments there.

The Maghrib. In spite of a long history of local separatism, disparate populations and ethnic groups and the varied political evolution of its component parts under foreign rule, the countries of the Maghrib have frequently sensed a common destiny. But historically the Maghrib has lacked a clearly defined power center. Morocco has tended to live in isolation, Algiers and Tunis -- like Tripoli and Benghazi -- were important trading stations but their control of the hinterland was only sporadic. The usual pattern of the area was that of successive waves of desert tribes which swept over one or another coastal area and merged more or less with its inhabitants to form a mixed Arabo-Berber culture. At such time as all of the Maghrib achieves full independence, Algeria will almost certainly become its principal power center for geographic, economic and population reasons, and because the Algerian Liberation Army is likely to emerge from the war as the most powerful force in the area. Although only rarely united under a common sovereign, Moroccans, Algerians, and Tunisians -- and some of the peoples of the Saharan regions as well -- have recently found a new common interest in the effort to win total independence from France.

IV. THE UNITY MOVEMENT IN THE ARAB WORLD

Just as in medieval times the Muslim world reflected the divisive factors of earlier history and geography operating against Islamic unity, so today do these factors operate against Arab unity. The common bond of religion did not prevent then the emergence, at various times and at the same time, of separate centers of political power corresponding roughly to the three regions previously described. So today the Arab unity movement has centers in both Baghdad and Cairo in the Arab East, and in Tunis and Rabat (pending Algerian independence) in North Africa. While most spokesmen of the unity movement postulate, as the ideal, unity of all the Arab peoples from Iraq to Morocco, in practice, for the foreseeable future, the distance between the two extremities of the Arab world is too

great to be bridged by the mere idea of union. At most, possibilities lie within the two ends of the Arab world -- Maghrib (Western) unity and Mashriq (Eastern) unity.

A. "Arabism" and the Arab Nation

The search for Arab unity is predicated upon the existence of a common "Arabism" or "Arabdom" which is conceived of as coterminous with the "Arab Nation." The consciousness of Arabs as being different from other subjects of the Ottoman Empire arose under European influence and in reaction to the Pan-Turanianism of the Young Turks and their attempts after 1908 to Turkify the Arab provinces of the Empire. Hence "Arabism" was initially a product of Syria and Lebanon, the intellectual centers of resistance to Turkification and was a non-sectarian ethnic movement which began primarily among Christians but in which Muslim Arabs and even Jews participated. However, during the mandate period the French policy of encouraging minority separatism stimulated confessional differences. Egyptian nationalism was entirely different in its origins; in Egypt, the drive for independence had initially an Islamic coloration, but as it developed, it stressed the unity of Copts and Muslims in winning independence from British rule. As the goals against the British and the French were won in Egypt and the Levant, the increasingly close contact between Egypt and the other Arab states, (spurred on by the need for unity against Israel) led to the closer identification of Egyptian goals with those of the advocates of Arab unity.

In current Arab usage the term qawmīyah, conveys the idea of a group of people of common descent or ethnic origin. While the theorists of Damascus and Cairo maintain that this concept is entirely secular, the social milieu in which they operate still in practice associates one's loyalties with one's religion. Hence ethnic minorities such as Kurds and religious minorities such as Lebanese Maronites and various other groups resist a concept of Arab unity that in practice would relegate them to an inferior status under Sunni Arab domination. These are the groups that represent the tendency of shu'ūbīyah or ethnic and religious separatism from the main body of the community. The theorists of Arab unity have tended also to confuse a common cultural tradition (language, literature, way of life) with political unity and to have assumed that because most Arabs stand together against outsiders they will do the same on purely internal issues. In fact, however, the historical political unity that the theorists assume to have existed represents an idealized picture without objective reality.

B. The Arab East

As the intellectual leader of the Arab struggle against foreign control, historic Syria has provided the locale for the earliest and most consistent exposition of the idea of Arab unity. Damascus, lacking the resources since Umayyad days to become itself a dominant power center,

has sought self-expression by indirect means, offering to sacrifice its identity to "Arabism." From the "Arab awakening" in the late 19th century to the forming of the Arab League, Damascus (and its neighbor Beirut) remained the ideological capital of Arab unity, but French control in Syria, indifference in Cairo, and Hashimite competition in Baghdad prevented any concerted and effective unity moves. However, after World War II, as a result of the attainment of Syrian, Lebanese, and Jordanian independence and the impending Palestine crisis, the Eastern Arab world began its move toward unity in earnest.

During World War II, Egyptian governments, seeking ways to end the British occupation, began to look with increased interest to their Arab neighbors, long at odds with the British in Palestine and briefly in 1941 in Iraq. British support of the idea of greater Arab unity, dictated by the exigencies of the war and endorsed by Nuri al-Sa'id, led to the formation of the Arab League and the restoration of Egypt to its traditional role of competitor to Iraq for leadership in the buffer zone between them. The League's operations were characterized by continued Egyptian attempts (in alliance with Syria and Saudi Arabia) to frustrate the schemes advanced from Baghdad (and Amman and London) for control of Syria.

Although Egyptians fought in Palestine in the name of "Arabism," it was not until 1955, in response to the Baghdad Pact (which to Egyptians meant Western determination to strengthen Baghdad as against Cairo), that the rulers of Egypt moved with rapidity and in earnest into a full scale commitment to Arab world politics. Within the space of a few years, Egyptian nationalism has been made synomynous with Arab nationalism. Drawing on all its resources, comparative wealth, historic tradition as an Islamic center, its influential press and radio, its reservoir of technicians, professional men and skilled administrators, Egypt proclaimed and, more important, gave to the Arabs that feeling of importance in world politics to which they had long aspired. The emotional satisfaction of assertion of Arab "rights" as in the Russian arms deal and the Canal nationalization coupled with the failure of the Western riposte at Suez, permitted Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir to become, in spite of the reserves of most Arab rulers, the popular champion of the Arab unity cause. In response to Syrian pressure, the UAR was formed under his aegis -- the first total renunciation of sovereignty by an Arab state and thus the first unqualified step toward Arab union. On a lesser but potentially more important level, the United Arab States was created between the UAR and Yemen -- an institution designed to accommodate diversity and sovereignty with a more effective solidarity.

Handicapped by pro-Western policies which ran counter to the anti-Westernism which had characterized Arab sentiment in Egypt and the Western Fertile Crescent since World War I, avowedly pro-Western Baghdad was unable to act successfully to meet the extension of Egyptian influence although an effort was made in the abortive and defensive Arab Union

between Iraq and Jordan. However, the collapse of the Nuri regime in the revolution of July 14, 1958 in Iraq, while initially hailed as a victory for the Arab unity movement, has in fact merely demonstrated that the change in dramatis personae does not automatically change the script. Today, for different reasons, Cairo and Baghdad continue to stand menacingly in conflict for control of the buffer zone between them and for leadership of the Arab unity movement.

C. The Arab West

In the Maghrib, the search for unity inevitably centers on the question of the liberation of Algeria and the Sahara from French control, a conflict in which Morocco and Tunisia as well as the Algerian FLN are playing an important role. Even if the urge for unity were not as strong as it is, Morocco and Tunisia would inevitably become involved in this struggle. French troops remain in both countries and both states provide sanctuary for FLN staging and training operations. In the meantime, Rabat and Tunis are pursuing their own interests but within the Maghrib context. Their methods and policies may differ in many respects, but any foreseeable regime in either country will be committed to support at least in principle and probably in practice the achievement of a free and united Maghrib.

V. THE OUTLOOK FOR UNITY

A. Arab East

Attitudes toward union in the Arab East have long been governed by the "formula" -- negative objectives unite while positive objectives divide. Arabs have generally been able to agree on the need for a common front against outsiders, but there has been no meaningful consensus in other fields. Thus, Nasser has often demonstrated that Egypt's influence can be effective in blocking policies distasteful to Cairo, but in the past his regime has been less successful in winning common Arab agreement on positive measures.

Some of the factors which have traditionally operated against Arab unity in the Arab East still apply, but, with less force. The capability of ruling traditionalist elites for protecting the status quo with or without outside help has been reduced; the disparities in modernization and administrative orientation among the several states are being reduced; the development of modern communications has cut distance within and between the various parts of the Arab world; and loyalties, while still importantly sectarian and provincial, are gradually undergoing transformation under the impact of modernization and secularization. On the other side, the positive factors which have encouraged the unity movement have been intensified: the sense of "Arabism" which encompasses the idea of common language, history, culture and religion has never before

been so deeply felt or widely accepted as a basis for action. Radio, films, press and publications, teachers and, in a few areas, television, have served as catalysts to create common attitudes and therefore more coherent and pressing demands for unity and reform. In the Arab East the fears, frustrations and aspirations of the communicants of Arabism have reached their greatest degree of articulation to date in the reformist regime of the Egyptian "revolution." Nasir has, for better or worse and for whatever it is worth, filled in the eyes of the majority of the area's middle class "the role wandering in search of a hero."

But the above description applies primarily to the Sunni Arab majority. While Arabism has tended to narrow the differences between the younger, semi-Westernized numbers of various Arab Muslim sects (such as Sunnis and Shiites, for example), the crystallization of this concept around an Arab and Sunni majority nucleus has caused minority non-Arab ethnic and non-Muslim religious groups to crystallize their own feeling of nationality around their own religious or ethnic cores. Many modern-educated middle-class Lebanese Christians, Iraqi Kurds, and even numerous Iraqi Shiites (it is significant that Qasim himself is said to belong to this last category) do not identify themselves with a "nation" that, they fear will, in the last analysis, be characterized by Sunni Muslim Arab dominance. As Arab unity gains momentum even greater pressure will be felt by these minority groups. The increasing spread of secularization and social change is already tending to undermine the traditional loyalties which have long sustained the concept of communalism. However in a few ares there remain significant minority groups prepared to align themselves with Arabs (such as Qasim) and even non-Arabs in the hope of maintaining their identity.

Nasir's position and that of the regime he heads have many vulnerabilities which tend to be obscured by the more obvious evidences of the Arab world's continuing struggle to clarify its relations with the great powers. Nasir has the advantage of being the exponent of the neutralist doctrine that is widely popular among the majority. His charges that Qasim is an agent of Moscow and a traitor to the Arab cause are reminiscent of his attacks on Nuri Sa'id, but Baghdad's counter-accusations have added a new dimension to the struggle between the two power centers of the Eastern Arab world. The Iraqi regime, in choosing to contest the "buffer zone" between the two regions, adds to its own formula for Arab unity the Marxist element of the class struggle. Accusing Nasir's regime of fascism, exploitation of the workers, imperialism, and bourgeois capitalism, Baghdad appeals to the peasants, workers and intellectuals not only of the western end of the Fertile Crescent but of the Persian Gulf and, by implication, of Egypt itself. Baghdad's charges strike a sensitive nerve. Nasir is still popular outside of Iraq among the Sunni Arab intelligentsia and proletariat who are antagonistic toward their own traditional or foreign-controlled regimes. But the UAR has yet to solve

the problem of the role of the "masses" now being given new political consciousness through the spread of literacy and economic development and the exhortations of the mass media. The efforts of the regime to channelize this broadened political activity will probably not produce a significant measure of support and the military elite group, as its power becomes institutionalized is likely to grow careless and increasingly corrupt. Still the chances of extensive changes in Egypt itself seem slim during the next ten years. The necessity to combat the danger of truly "revolutionary" ideologies inspired by Baghdad, to hold Syria, and to secure the oil of Libya and the Arabian Peninsula and the water of the Sudan are likely to inhibit internal dissension and, together with the Israeli "threat," to rally, as in the past, the bulk of Egyptian opinion in support of "Arab glory" through "Arab solidarity."

The Egyptian task will not be easy. The deep suspicions which divide the ruling elites of the Arab East and especially fears of Egyptian and Muslim domination have not yet been overcome and in some cases have been strengthened by popular endorsement of Nasir's leadership. The existence of the UAR can probably be maintained, although increasing security measures will be necessary in the Syrian region. The Lebanese attitude toward the UAR will depend upon the degree of pressure exerted on the Lebanese Christians to conform. Jordan's internal factionalism will present a constant temptation to outside intervention, but the risk of Israeli reaction may inhibit closer ties between Amman and the UAR or Iraq. In Saudi Arabia, Egypt has long played on fear of Iraqi expansionism to its own advantage and Baghdad's new orientation should permit the UAR to improve its position. However, in Kuwait and the other sheikhdoms, the UAR's position is less strong. It may be that the rulers, faced with the alternative of sharing their powers with the middle-class or yielding them to the workers, will seek with British support to repress all forms of political activity -- a tactic which would seem to have validity only in the very short run, and is likely to have the results recently observable in Iraq.

But in extending its influence in the buffer zone Egypt may be assuming commitments beyond its capacity. For Egypt and its allies will have at the same time to cope with the political evolution now plaguing the Saudis, the Gulf rulers, King Husayn, and the British in Aden. Harmony on foreign and "Arab" policy by no means guarantees internal stability or a moratorium on the social mobility which increasingly characterizes the Eastern Arab world. Nor will Egypt be unconcerned by African developments. The Sudan's conflicting religious and secular factions will continue to bring instability to the upper Nile. In Libya, the demise of King Idris is likely to bring about chaotic conditions in which elements prepared to tolerate the continuation of Western military facilities will almost certainly be in conflict with the advocates of a neutralism modeled on that of Cairo.

It would seem that the trends in the area are such that the prospects for survival of the Egyptian military regime over the long run are not very bright unless it can broaden its base and change its tactics so as to be more tolerant of diversity. Otherwise frustration is bound to grow, especially among the middle-class intelligentsia, producing a corps of leaders to whom radicalism, with or without Soviet coloration, is likely increasingly to appeal. The social conditions of the area and the prejudices of the regime would seem to make difficult the adoption of the secular and doctrinaire socialism which seems likely to dominate the Maghrib and much of Black Africa. But the socialist secular doctrine of the Ba'thists, if effectively practised, might permit the development of a more broadly based Arab unity which -- by combining the intellectual appeal of the Western end of the Fertile Crescent with the power of the Nile and the material resources of the Arabian peninsula and perhaps Libya might resolve -- perhaps for a considerable period of time -- the struggle for unity in the Arab East.

We do not think the Iraqis will have much luck in extending their influence even in the Persian Gulf over the next few years. Qasim in rejecting Arab unity of the Nasir brand has isolated himself and Iraq from the Sunni majority of the Arab world. Qasim's friendship for the alien, non-Arab forces of the USSR and communism has contributed to this isolation as the Hashimite regime's membership in the Baghdad Pact isolated Iraq in the past. Iraq's isolation has been greater than was that of the Nuri regime because of the fears of revolutionary social change which its communist-infiltrated government has aroused throughout the area. However, while many Iraqi Arabs do not follow Nasir's views, neither do they wish to be divorced from the comforting feeling of membership in the Arab family. Qasim senses this, and probably will seek to drift closer to a more neutral position and resist further communist gains. Should he succeed, Iraq, although not likely to espouse union with Egypt on the Syrian pattern, might favor a strengthened Arab League, or even be willing to participate in a loose confederation somewhat on the model of the UAS. Such policies could in time blunt -- but not fully overcome -- the deep-rooted suspicions and rivalries for power which have blocked Islamic unity since the fall of the Umayyad Caliphate.

B. The Arab West

The first prerequisite for unity in the Arab West is the liquidation of French control of Algeria, an event which seems unlikely in the absence of a political reaction in France itself or the spreading of the rebellion and massive outside intervention on behalf of the Arabs such as produced the independence of Syria, Lebanon, and the Indo-Chinese states. Meanwhile the Moroccans, the Tunisians, and the Algerians of the FLN will, as best they can, improve and expand the formal and informal coordination of activity which is progressively increasing in operational and policy matters. However, under the pressure of the Algerian question,

the orientation of the Maghrib's leaders is slowly changing as new groups come forward to advocate more extreme policies to meet both domestic and Maghrib needs. More than anything else, the Algerian situation has deprived North Africa's reformists of their best arguments and permitted the radicals to level against them the two charges of neglect of the interests of the masses and failure to work sincerely for the Maghrib's independence and unity. Changes are taking place especially rapidly in Morocco, where the old-guard reformist leadership with the acquiescence of the King has all but lost control of the independence movement to younger leaders of labor, youth and the rural proletariat. But even in Tunisia, where the independence movement was better organized and splits have been avoided through adroit maneuver, the elan of the reformist regime seems to be somewhat less vigorous than in the past. Given the political acumen of Morocco's King Muhammad and Tunisia's President Bourguiba, change is likely to come about in comparative calm. Both are acutely sensitive to popular sentiment and in spite of their personal preferences have known how to avoid the mistakes of more unbending leaders like King Saud and President Sham'un. The similarly oriented regimes which will emerge in Morocco, Tunisia, and -- after independence is gained -- Algeria, may differ among themselves from time to time on border and other intra-regional problems. However in their relations with the outside world the Maghrib states will almost certainly speak with a united voice.

C. The Arab -- East and West

The Arab West's contacts with the Arab East have been few in the past and at the present time they are still essentially limited to Egyptian and Iraqi assistance to the Algerians and to Tunisian and, to a lesser extent, Moroccan hostility toward Egyptian "interference" in their own internal affairs. The prestige of Cairo as a cultural center has some attraction for the Maghribis, but they tend to look to Europe, and especially to France for their political models and to the south as the direction of their natural expansion. They are establishing ties with the radical regimes and labor student organizations of West Africa, and there seems little likelihood that they will be greatly influenced by the course of events in the Arab-East. Even the establishment of a pro-Egyptian regime in the buffer zone of Libya would have only a temporary impact, although such a regime would probably accelerate the undermining of Bourguiba's gradualist policies, already under heavy pressures from the French and the FLN.

Further complicating the developments of closer bonds are the fundamental cultural differences which characterize the two areas. Most of the Maghribi intelligentsia criticize the failure of the Arab East to develop political institutions of a truly popular nature. Nor do they appreciate the disparaging comments of the Easterners, who tend to look down on the strange ways of the predominantly rural yet increasingly well

organized and dynamic Arab West. The Maghrib's proximity to Western Europe and the French colonization period, have produced a considerable acceptance of European ideas without, however, especially in Tunisia, giving rise to the sense of inferiority which has long over-laid the reaction of the urban areas of the Arab East to European innovation. Perhaps, as in Black Africa, the very lack of indigenous governmental and social institutions suitable to the requirements of the industrial age facilitated the process of acculturation. Whether for that reason or because the essentially rural Maghribis were more confident of their own ability to cope with change than the more complex urbanites of the Eastern Mediterranean, contact between Europe and North Africa has produced political but not necessarily cultural conflict. Indeed the Maghribis have welcomed European patterns of thinking and action which seem to open new vistas in the fields of social and political endeavor. The struggle for Algerian independence, therefore, does not have quite the same emotional overtones as does the Palestine question in the Arab East. There is no desire to replace French with Arab values but to be free to choose such methods and policies as may seem most in keeping with the Maghrib's interests.

Traditional group-bound values are more important in the Arab East, the "heartland" of orthodox Islam. The conflict between this emotional commitment and an intellectual appreciation of the need for modernization produces a reserve toward foreign-inspired innovation. This reaction is intensified by a long and, to the Eastern Arab, unending struggle for freedom from great power manipulation and expresses itself in cultural as well as political ambivalence towards the non-Arab world. Increasingly the bonds of "Arabism" will bring in some degree a greater harmony of objectives, especially in the field of foreign policy, between the Maghrib and the Mashriq. Morocco's policy of non-dependence, as well as its relative remoteness, have produced a more positive approach to Arab unity that has so far been possible in Tunisia. However, the prospects for ties closer than those provided by the Arab League seem almost nil.

VI. RELATIONS WITH THE NON-ARAB WORLD

A. The Arab East and the West

The West is now clearly faced with the prospect of the eventual collapse of such of its positions of predomanance as are based on the support of traditionalist elites. In their relations with the West the middle-class reformist regimes of the Arab East have produced controversy in varying degrees. Their rise to power has been characterized by a determination to destroy Western "positions of influence" and strongholds of minority opposition having Western backing as preventing that unity in neutrality which they hold to be necessary to preserve Arab independence and assure Arab growth and "glory." This conflict between the West (including Israel) and the Eastern Arab middle-class regimes has had as its major consequence the entry of the Soviet Union as a counter-weight.

The events of Iraq, however, have added a new dimension to the problems of the reformists. As they see it, the pendulum has swung too far the other way. In place of traditionalists and separatists supported by a fading Western strength they face the prospect of radicals backed by an expansionist USSR and Communist China. Consequently Nasir now clearly seeks to enlarge his freedom of action to meet this new (and far more serious) threat by reducing his dependence on Bloc trade and aid by developing compensating relationships with the West -- the "non-imperialist" West if possible, but the "imperialist" West if necessary. But just as the West is inhibited in its relations with Nasir because of past conflicts, so Nasir can hardly give up his own distrust of Western motives, so deeply are they rooted in the middle-class from which the Arab East's reformists come. For example, Nasir and his supporters will almost certainly continue their efforts to reduce Western influence in such sectors of the "Arab homeland" as the Persian Gulf, Libya, the Sudan, and Jordan. Egypt will also continue to seek an active role in East Africa and the Horn and the problem of Israel will further complicate a rapprochement between Egypt and the West. Even if Nasir were disposed to do otherwise, pressure from Baghdad seeking to establish itself as the only legitimate spokesman for Arab democracy and independence is likely to force him -- or his successor -- to increase rather than reduce the pressure on Western positions. If the Baghdad regime continues its leftward orientation and presents a serious challenge to Nasir's reformist concepts the choice before the West may become more simplified and more acute, but a polarization of the eastern Arab world along class lines would not be likely to enhance Western influence. Since fear of the East in no way implies a disposition to accept Western patronage, the issue is simply -- for the Arabs -- to balance uncontrollable powers, and each side will be watched with equal care for signs that it might overstep the bounds and seek a "special" position.

B. The Arab East and the USSR

The USSR now stands accused by Cairo of "imperialist" adventurism and promotion of separatist tendencies. Nevertheless, USSR short range intentions are not yet completely clear. The 21st Party Congress raised the possibility that the USSR was considering at least a shift in emphasis if not a change of policy towards bourgeois nationalism as epitomized by Nasir and Nehru. This possibility has been made more real by developments in Iraq and by certain comments Khrushchev has addressed to Nasir in their current dialogue over the role of Communists in the Arab world. The USSR, having exploited nationalist hostility to the West to establish a position in the area, appears to be beginning to exploit -- as a priority and explicitly what has been heretofore only secondary and implicit -- the turbulent Arab pressures for social change and the desire of the minority for security from domination by the majority. Circumstances have provided it with the historically important competition between the Nile Valley and Mesopotamia to use in the challenge (if such it is or becomes) to

bourgeois, middle-class reformists in the Arab East. The developments in Iraq may be largely indigenous, and possibly have moved too hastily and too blatantly to suit the purposes of the USSR. But Moscow may find its prestige as well as its aid increasingly committed to the radicalism in Baghdad. However much the USSR may prefer to maintain important influence in the Nile Valley, the fury and violence of Nasir's attacks on Soviet "imperialism" may offer it no choice but to support Baghdad. Through Egypt the Soviets may have hoped to establish influence in Africa, but relations between Egypt and the African states are difficult. In any case the stakes in Iraq are high. Even the Czars have never come so close to the historic Russian aspiration of reaching the Persian Gulf.

C. The Maghrib, the West and the USSR

The relationships of the Arab West with the Western powers and with the USSR differ in emphasis from those prevailing in the East. North Africans are more latitudinarian than their eastern cousins and the conflict with France is seen as political and military rather than ideological. Western support is actively solicited in a spirit of reciprocity, although Soviet aid has not been excluded. Even North Africa's radicals, like their European socialist counterparts, are hostile to Communists -- their rivals for the leadership of the masses -- and would not be deluded as to the risks they ran. Bloc arms deals may not involve ideological commitments, but the inevitable result of a failure of North Africa and the West to reach an accommodation will almost certainly involve the area's moving from the profession of neutralism to its practice.

D. The Arabs and the Asian States

Communist China increasingly interests most Arabs as a powerful state which has rid itself of colonialism and has begun to play a role in world politics suitable to its size and cultural heritage. Chinese unification and rise to the status of a great power strongly suggests to Arabs parallels with their own decline, division, and struggle to regain a place in the sun. Many Arabs, too, have hoped that Communist China would be less sensitive to European considerations than the USSR and therefore more willing to provide arms and other forms of assistance which the Soviet Union might be embarrassed to supply.

Arab attitudes towards the non-Communist Asian States are primarily influenced by the latter's foreign policies. This is particularly noticeable in the different degrees of friendliness between the several Arab governments and the Baghdad Pact States. Thus for some time relations between the neutralist UAR and Turkey, Iran and Pakistan have been cool. Arab relations with India, Indonesia and other Asian states have been cordial, on the whole, but not particularly close.

E. The Arabs and Africa

On the other hand the Arab states are becoming increasingly involved in African affairs. Maghribi interest in the Sahara and in West Africa has already been mentioned. While Arab overtures are still somewhat tentative and not entirely reciprocated by West Africans, the Sahara is becoming a bridge rather than a barrier. To Black Africans, the struggle for Algerian independence is not dissimilar to the circumstances of the settler areas of eastern and southern Africa. Ultimately the interests of the Maghrib and the West Africans may clash in the sub-Saharan areas, but for the moment relations are likely to grow closer, especially with the French-speaking areas.

The course of Egypt's relations with Africans is much less clear. In dealing with West Africans, the Egyptians are handicapped, as in the Maghrib, by the narrow basis and outlook of their regime and the bitterness of their feelings toward the Western powers. The more confident West Africans are not attracted by either feature of Egyptian reformism. But in the settler areas of East and Central Africa where racial bitterness is on the rise, Egyptian attacks on the "white dogs" are beginning to find a receptive audience, even among those repelled by the Egyptian regime itself. In fact a significant question in East and Central Africa is whether racialism will win out over the non-racial concept of "one man, one vote" now advocated by moderate African leaders. The bases of Egypt's interests in East Africa are peripheral but growing. Although it contains the source of the White Nile and has a small Arab and somewhat larger Moslem population, Egypt's immediate concern is to eliminate the "imperialists" from the area. The Horn of Africa is a more immediate area of Egyptian concern. The Blue Nile waters, the region's proximity to the Yemen and Aden, and the historic conflict between the Christian Amhara elite of Ethiopia and the surrounding Moslem populations all furnish justification in Egyptian eyes for actions designed to exploit events in the area in Egypt's favor.

Arab interest in African affairs is likely to increase tensions among Arabs, Africans, and the West. Whether in the form of efforts to undermine the position of the French and their supporters in Mauritania, Cameroun or French Somaliland, or the British in Kenya and Zanzibar, or through encouragement of pan-Somalism and Eritrean separatism, the weight of Arab influence will be in favor of changes to the detriment of present colonial holdings.